In today's world, information can wield power comparable to physical weapons, making the control of narratives essential for national security. Have you ever wondered how a single
leaked conversation could define military strategies? The Taurus affair serves as a striking
example of this phenomenon, revealing how indirect operations and disinformation can be as powerful or if used correctly more powerful than conventional weapons.
On February 19, 2024, a conversation among German Air Force officials about the potential
use of Taurus cruise missiles in Ukraine was intercepted and leaked by EU-sanctioned
Russian state media Russia Today (RT). This incident not only exposed vulnerabilities in
military communications but also illustrated Russia's strategic use of disinformation to
influence public perception and policy decisions amid the ongoing Full-Scale Russian
Invasion of Ukraine.
Here it will be examined how Russia's regime uses indirect operations and disinformation strategically as non-physical weapons to achieve (geo)political goals. But first, what is the German Taurus-Affair?
The German Taurus-Affair
The Taurus-Affair began when a 38-minute recording of a discussion among four senior
German Air Force officials was leaked by Russia Today (RT) Editor-in-Chief Margarita
Simonyan, who claimed to have received the file from Russian security officials.
This conversation involved key figures such as Air Force Inspector Ingo Gerhartz and focused on operational capabilities and potential deployment scenarios for Taurus cruise missiles in the context of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. One part of the discussion considered whether the missiles could reach the “bridge”, likely referring to the Kerch Bridge, an essential link between Crimea and the Russian mainland.
The officers debated under what conditions Germany should or could supply these missiles to Ukraine, considering their strategic implications and the position of the German government. They emphasized that any military action involving these missiles could be viewed by Russia as direct German involvement in the ongoing Invasion. This discussion revolved around the so-called "red line" which Chancellor Olaf Scholz had publicly ruled out due to concerns about engaging in direct conflict with Russia.
Notably, this audio leak by Russia Today (RT) also raised questions about Germany's internal unity regarding its support for Ukraine, revealing underlying divisions that existed prior to the leak, what quickly ignited an international media firestorm. The wiretapping in the Taurus-Affair demonstrates how indirect operations and disinformation can serve as weapons to realize (geo)political goals, as will become clear in what follows.
To understand this, let's briefly explore what indirect operations and disinformation entail.
Indirect Operations and Disinformation
Indirect operations seek to influence adversaries without direct confrontation by altering
public perception and destabilizing political processes. In the context of the Taurus
wiretapping affair, Russia's motivations were evident; by leaking the sensitive audio, it sought to project an image of Germany as weak and divided. This tactic effectively portrayed Western allies as lacking unity in their military support for Ukraine.
Disinformation exemplifies this strategy. It involves selectively presenting information to
create distrust and certain narratives. It is not merely about spreading falsehoods; often, it
involves manipulating true facts by stripping them out of context or blending them with
inaccuracies to support a specific agenda. For instance, Russian state media claimed, “Berlin would send up to 50 long-range missiles to Ukraine”, a misleading assertion that stirred unease both domestically and internationally.
Russia’s Goals and Tactics
Of course, these tactics have goals. One of Russia's regimes primary goals in leaking the audio recording was to portray Germany as hesitant and indecisive regarding its support for
Ukraine. This narrative played directly into the Kremlin's broader strategy of sowing discord
among Western allies. Furthermore, one could argue that Russia sought to stir unease and use fear within its own society by basically claiming that Germany was planning to attack Russia with Taurus missiles and to therefore not only turn their own society against the West, but also to sow fear for live and insecurity in their own society.
This strategic use of disinformation reached its peak, when Russian politicians like Dmitry
Medvedev used the audio leak to evoke fear among the Russian populace by referencing
historical trauma with posting statements on telegram such as, “И снова ставший
актуальным призыв времен Великой Отечественной войны: СМЕРТЬ НЕМЕЦКО-
ФАШИСТСКИМ ОККУПАНТАМ!” which translates as “The call of the Great Patriotic War
has become relevant again: DEATH TO THE GERMAN-FASCIST OCCUPIERS!”. This
rhetoric aimed to unite Russian society against perceived and potential threats from Western countries while simultaneously painting Germany as Fascists and as a direct war participant and in the ongoing Invasion.
It’s important to note that the leaked conversation did contain factual information. However,
the way it was presented differed significantly. RT selectively highlighted elements that
supported their narrative, while Medvedev used emotionally charged rhetoric to provoke a
reaction. The real challenge lies in separating the actual content of the recording from the
various interpretations and narratives constructed around it by different actors.
Through these tactics Russia’s regime effectively shifted public perception both domestically and internationally regarding military support for Ukraine in Russia and in Germany. The implications of such disinformation extend beyond immediate political outcomes; they can reshape public discourse and influence policy decisions on a larger scale. Ultimately, this operation aimed to achieve Russia’s main goal: preventing Germany from supporting Ukraine with Taurus missiles. By spreading fear through disinformation and
manipulation, this strategy seeks to exploit public concerns and influence political decision-
making in Germany. This case underscores the reality that in the battle for public perception, information is not just power; it is a weapon that can shape the course of war and therefore history.
References:
Medvedev, D. (2024, February 19). [Telegram post]. Telegram. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/457
RT. (2024, February 19). Crimean Bridge attack discussion ‘a disgrace for Germany’ –
Moscow. RT News. https://www.rt.com/news/593620-germany-ukraine-crimea-taurus/
Deutschlandfunk. (2024, February 19). Abhöraffäre bei der Bundeswehr: Bedingt
abwehrbereit. Deutschlandfunk. https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/abhoeraffaere-bei-
der-bundeswehr-bedingt-abwehrbereit-dlf-df1fab60-100.html
BR24. (2024, February 19). Pistorius: Abgehörtes Taurus-Gespräch wegen
Anwendungsfehler. BR24. https://www.br.de/nachrichten/deutschland-welt/pistorius-
abgehoertes-taurus-gespraech-wegen-anwendungsfehler,U68PGHX
StopFake.org. (2020). Anatomy of an info war: How Russia's propaganda machine
works and how to counter it. https://www.stopfake.org/en/anatomy-of-an-info-war-
how-russia-s-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/
Cameco. (2020–2024). Disinformation: Open access
publications. https://www.cameco.org/media/disinformation-open-access-publications-
2020-2024.pdf
Politico.eu. (2024, February 19). The Russian MFA summoned Germany’s
ambassador in Moscow amid a leaked Bundeswehr audio
scandal. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/the-russian-mfa-summoned-
germanys-ambassador-in-moscow-amid-a-leaked-bundeswehr-audio-scandal/
Andreas Seger. (2024, February 19). [Video].
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