By Adam Crhák
Gerasimov doctrine, named after the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces
General Valery Gerasimov, has become a widely recognized term. Coined by Mark Galeotti in a blog post from 2014 reacting to the Russian occupation of Crimea and regurgitated by
virtually all Western media outlets reviewing the topic, it has entered the public consciousness and fascinated the public ever since. Sensational newspaper headlines, such as “It’s Russia’s new chaos theory of political warfare. And it’s probably being used on you” were, at one point, all over the internet. But what is the Gerasimov doctrine, how it came to dominate the media, and does it even exist?
The idea stems from an article Gerasimov authored called “The Value of Science in
Foresight” published in a relatively obscure defense industry journal in February 2013. There, Gerasimov expressed his understanding of contemporary warfare which transcends the conventional concept of peace and wartime and is characterized by a fusion of various forms of soft and hard power. He recognizes, that in order for Russia not to play catch-up to other great powers, it must focus on new perspectives and develop fresh ideas on how to conduct military operations and pursue strategies, emphasizing the importance of asymmetric forms and means of military conduct. In short, many have associated the term with an expanded understanding of modern warfare, or even a vision of total war, and the contemporary approach Russia has adopted towards the West.
Mark Galeotti, the man who was among the few who took notice of the article and the
first to use the term, himself later apologized, admitting that the term was nothing more than a catchy title for his blog post. “A blog is as much as anything else a vanity site; obviously I want people to read it. So for a snappy title, I coined the term “Gerasimov doctrine,” though even then I noted in the text that this term was nothing more than “a placeholder,” and “it certainly isn’t a doctrine.” he explained in an article in 2018. In fact, Gerasimov himself reacted to how his article has been misrepresented by Western media. Supposedly, he intended to expose how Western powers operate in the changing environment of international conflicts and to urge Russian military circles to adapt and innovate. In other words, Gerasimov’s article was a reactive one, exposing, in his eyes, the hybrid warfare perpetrated by the West, and did not intend to proclaim a new Russian military doctrine.
That is not to discredit the fact that Russia does engage in a mixed form of warfare and
in that sense, the term has its utility. However, it is important to note that Gerasimov’s vision
is far from revolutionary and Russia’s long-term strategic approach in geopolitics can hardly
be attributed to him specifically. The architects of national security policy in Russia have
historically rarely come from the ranks of the military, whose role was usually limited to its
implementation. Since the late 1990s, the leading theory of Russia’s security policy was the
so-called Primakov doctrine. Named after former foreign and prime minister Yevgeni
Primakov, the doctrine posits that a unipolar world dominated by a single power (read the
United States) is an unacceptable assumption for Russia. Therefore, Russia should by any
possible means ensure a multipolar world, where major powers compete in their respective
spheres of influence. In this context, Gerasimov’s views should be seen as a mere
continuation, or specification of this baseline doctrine.
In conclusion, Gerasimov doctrine is a term often overused in the headlines of Western media outlets and the public discourse alike. It is neither a doctrine nor specifically from the mind of General Gerasimov himself. The ill-fated term has confused Western military analysists and failed to anticipate future developments. Nevertheless, Russia’s long-lasting efforts combining political, subversive, and military operations to destabilize the West ought to be studied and understood however we decide to label them in the end.
About the author: Adam Crhák is currently finishing both his Master degree in law and in Area studies focusing on the post-Soviet space. He has been a research assistant at the Department of International Law, Charles University, for two years. His main interests in international law lie in the use of force and different aspects of humanitarian law, particularly in the law of targeting. He is also focusing on contemporary security concerns regarding Russian activities in cyberspace and beyond.
References:
McKew, M. K. (September/October 2017). The Gerasimov Doctrine It’s Russia’s new chaos theory of political warfare. And it’s probably being used on you. Politico Magazine.
Rumer, E. (2019). The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) doctrine in action. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Galeotti, M. (2019, July 23). I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’ Foreign Policy.
McDermott, R. N. (2016). Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine? The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, 46(1). https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2827.
Bartles, C. K. (2016). Getting Gerasimov Right (By Military Review).
National Defense University Press. (n.d.). On the “Gerasimov Doctrine”: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1981229/on-the-gerasimov-doctrine-why-the-west-fails-to-beat-russia-to-the-punch/.
Ng, N. & Rumer, E. (2019). The West Fears Russia’s Hybrid Warfare. They’re Missing the Bigger Picture. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/07/the-west-fears-russias-hybrid-warfare-theyre-missing-the-bigger-picture?lang=en.
Comments